Purely bilateral dialogue between us and China to win our right
in the West Philippine Sea won’t do. It is the height of naiveté to believe it will.
China’s actuation in the disputed waters has made it obvious
that might trumps right. It has been that way with conflicts even before the
first empire appeared on the planet. China won't be the exception.
In the 19th and 20th centuries, nation
states that resisted the “benevolent” intrusion of colonizers would ultimately
yield due to the gunboat diplomacy, the use of overpowering navy artillery when
talks fell.
For the past 15 years, China has employed against its weak
neighbors approximately the same tactic in enforcing possession over 90 percent
of the South China Sea and a large portion of our exclusive economic zone. This
is to flex superior military muscle.
China is occupying the large ocean out there and encroaching
in our waters, not because of the truthfulness or rightfulness of its nine-dash
line, but because of the might of its naval and air assets. Had it nothing like
them, it wouldn’t even think of trying.
By building an artificial island in the Spratlys, the
Chinese government has signified the intention to lay over for good. No diplomatic
words, persuasive reasoning, legality or resort to gift-laden compromises will
stop that.
We have nothing to contest China’s aggression in terms of
equal war capability on air and sea. Are we to believe that its bullying patrols
are going to abandon the territory and retreat to their mainland shores out of
moral compunction, or deference to an aggrieved friendly neighbor?
Moral persuasion or begging doesn’t work in resolving territorial disputes. Neither is readiness to give up what otherwise should be a
non-negotiable position – like our exclusive marine entitlement, in exchange
for some project with dubious social and economic value.
On the other hand, resorting to bilateral talks forfeits the
one big advantage of our cause: the potent backing of other stakeholders. This
involves not only economic and political pressure, but composite military force, not only for parity, but to get the upper hand in maneuver or brinkmanship.
Alone by ourselves across the negotiating table, we will
have no option but to just play foolhardy or grudgingly accept the inevitable, because
we have waived our source of strength: the big stakes of powers – equal to or
even greater than China, that are interested in settling the rift in our favor.
Bilateralism should be borne in mind as not just an
alternative or a parallel track to the multilateral approach. It is opposite to the latter, for it shuns the involvement of other concerned parties. It excludes the
other nations which also have stake on the outcome. It cancels out multilateral resolution.
The problem with this is it foists two counterproductive effects.
One is we lose bargaining chips, or political ammunition when fireworks become
inevitable. Second is we do not only ignore, but end up trashing, the equally
important concerns of other geopolitical players. Thus, we alienate them,
instead of mustering a united front, with them weighing in.
Our interest on the West Philippine Sea is linked to the
interest of the global community at large, that is: in disputes and
international relations the rule of law must be followed. In the case of the
WPS conflict, it is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Throw the
pact away, and it opens an uncertain course fraught with political and economic
hazards for every maritime nation.
Under UNCLOS, Filipinos are accorded the right to solely conduct
economic activity over and underneath the Scarborough Shoal and Spratly. Won’t
any developing nation like us want to enshrine that rule with no ifs and buts?
It is for our economic growth, national security, internal stability and social
development that China clears out of those waters less than 250 kilometers off
our shorelines.
Why then should countries like America, Japan, Australia, India
and now, coming into the fray, France and the European Union bother that we win
in this? The magic phrase as well as the basis for it is the interest of FREEDOM OF
NAVIGATION: their freedom.
If the UNCLOS is ruled out in the case of the West
Philippine Sea, it means that China’s territorial claim on almost all of the
South China Sea prevails. And if the SCS indeed becomes the exclusive lake of
the People’s Republic of China, then the other countries can no longer pass there
by air or by sea, without anybody's permission, as they used to since time
immemorial.
It does not go deep to see that our loss in the
dispute will be bad not only to our country, but also to others. A defeat will have
the repercussion of disturbing the existing world order in a tremendous way. It
will alter the present geopolitical and economic landscape with outcomes that
may no longer be acceptable to a large number of members in the community of
nations.
For the vast part of the South China Sea to be declared no
longer international waters and the traditionally free maritime routes closed
to transnational shipping lines plying their old commerce, is untenable. It
will truly wreak havoc on the global market and rearrange the economic status
quo.
If countries, like the United States, Japan, South Korea,
Australia, India, France, the United Kingdom, Germany and Canada are unable to ply
anymore the vital sea and air lanes to our west whether for economic or
military purposes, unless the PRC approves, a powder-keg situation will arise.
It may take only a match stick of an accidental or intentional collision of hostile
forces to light up a conflagration far worse than World War II.
The festering conflict in the West Philippine Sea is
definitely not just a problem between our country and China. It is a problem of
many nations. It is one with overarching global implications that countries affected
would be in a good place to take part. It therefore demands multilateral
solution.
Finally, international leverage drawn in by the inter-regional
nature of the issue can be used to maximum political advantage for us.
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